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ABSTRACT: A clear difficulty today is to find practical organisational modelling dealing specifically with
major hazard prevention and to be able to compare them in order to potentially enhance their relevance. This
work is an attempt to do so. This paper provides a comparison of the differences, the common and comple-
mentary features of the I-RISK model (developed within the European I-RISK project) and the MIRIAM
model (developed at INERIS, France).
1 INTRODUCTION
INERIS has been working for 2 years on a method-
ology named MIRIAM, which stands for "Maîtrise
Intégrée des Risques d'Accidents Majeurs" (Inte-
grated Control of Major Accident Risk). The
MIRIAM method, based on an organisational model
introducing a human factor approach, is aimed at
implementing and assessing safety management
systems. A next step in this work, through its devel-
opment phase, is to compare it to other existing or-
ganisational models.
The model developed under the I-RISK research
program (Integrated Risk) in the EU 4th Framework
Program, had as objective the production of a prob-
ability of major hazard occurrence on a chemical
site, weighted by human and organisational influ-
ences. The Safety Science Group of TU Delft, with
Linda Bellamy of SAVE, developed the organisa-
tional modelling (Hale et al 1999).
Both INERIS and Safety Science Group acknowl-
edge the importance of the organisational aspects in
major hazard prevention and agree on the necessity
of comparing modelling to enhance the ability of
modellers to introduce these important aspects into
risk assessment.
In this paper, the result of the comparison of the
two models is presented. These results will be par-
ticularly useful for the ARAMIS program. This pro-
gram under the EU 5t Framework Program has the
objective of producing a harmonised risk assessment
methodology for Europe and includes the measure-
ment of safety management effectiveness.
The paper is structured around 5 modelling areas
under which the differences as well as the common
and complementary aspects are discussed:
- a process approach to the organisational models,
- the interface between the technical and organisa-
tional models,
- the factors influencing the interface with the
technical modelling,
- the conceptual approach to what is traditionally
called the "human factor" in the risk field,
- the issue of management priorities
- the modelling representation.
2 A PROCESS APPROACH
The MIRIAM model is based on a process approach
that consists in decomposing the activities of an or-
ganisation. A process is seen as a system of activities
that transforms inputs into outputs using resources
and constraints. The final outputs in our case of
safety management modelling are the safety related
activities.
The I-RISK model used the SADT, (Structured
Analysis and Design Technique) for the modelling
of the safety management system, which is originally
a technique that is useful for system planning, re-
quirements analysis and system design. This type of
decomposition has the same inputs, outputs, re-
sources and constraints as the process approach used
in MIRIAM (figure 1).
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Inputs Activity of the safety
management system
Outputs: depending on what is
defined as observed variables,
see the part in the "interface" in
this paper
Resources
Figure 1: a process approach applied to major hazard prevention
The principle of this type of decomposition is to
be functional. It is a "black box" approach that helps
to focus not on "how it is done" but rather on "what
it does". It is therefore relevant for anything that
transforms inputs into outputs, meaning that any or-
ganisation can be described as a set of functions to
be achieved, rather than in terms of the actual struc-
ture specified to achieve them. This process decom-
position therefore allows a representation that suits
various types of organisation and can be a support to
comparing the effectiveness of their risk control - do
they have the functions in place and working?
The underlying management science principle
that is described through this decomposition is the
PDCA, Plan-Do-Check-Act loop. It describes a
feedback loop. This is a required feature of any goal-
oriented systems. Safety management systems have a
risk control objective, and must be moving towards
this goal thanks to the application of this principle.
Both the MIRIAM and I-RISK models have this
feedback and learning function that can be illustrated
through the following cybernetic figure (figure 2):
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Figure 2: basic components of a control system
All these elementary components have to be de-
fined and described through the process decomposi-
tion and all of them are equally important. For a
system dedicated to major hazard prevention, these
steps could be briefly described as follows:
O The goal
The goal of a safety management system is the con-
trol or prevention of major hazard. For that, the haz-
ards must be identified and the risks assessed, in or-
der to know what is the type and level of risk
generated by the activity. In both MIRIAM and I-
RISK risk analysis is recognised as a core activity
which provides the information about what the sys-
tem has to control and monitor.
© Decisions
From that risk analysis activity, decisions should be
taken about the measures to be implemented for risk
control. These are technical measures as well as hu-
man/procedural and organisational ones. Technical
measures include the implementation of safety de-
vices, human measures include the use of competent
people to carry out safety procedures or diagnose un-
safe situations, whilst organisational measures in-
clude the maintenance planning of the devices, or the
training of the operator on safety issues etc. At this
stage the safety management system has set up its
objectives to be reached through the implementation
of the actions. In both MIRIAM and I-RISK this de-
cisional aspect is represented using arrows that indi-
cate information/decision/action flows.
©. Actions
From those decisions, actions are carried out in or-
der to reach the objectives. These actions consist of
implementing the training, implementing the
maintenance planning, and all of the many other
safety-related activities. In both MIRIAM and I-
RISK these activities (operation, maintenance, in-
spection etc) are explicitly mentioned.
© Affected/observed variables
The actions taken must meet the objectives, and
these objectives are the affected/observed variables.
The choice of the affected/observed variables is cru-
cial. Indeed these variables, in a risk control per-
spective, are the reference, and they are under the in-
fluence of the environmental disturbances. What
should be the appropriate observed variables is not
so well defined in the risk management literature.
Many options are mentioned, including risk percep-
tion, safety culture or climate, procedures for safety
related activities (i.e. management standard or guid-
ance), power plays within the organisation, motiva-
tion etc. The very complexity of human activity re-
veals numerous relevant factors from organisational
life (from psychology, organisational sociology, er-
gonomie, politics, etc.). The difficulty is to define
the relevant ones. In the next section the interfaces
created with the technical model are discussed for
MIRIAM and I-RISK and the affected/observed
variables chosen each will be introduced.
The environment creates disturbances, or devia-
tions from the desired goals. These can be internal
perturbations like conflicts between people, the lack
of commitment due to production pressure, but also
the installation itself can generate a wide variety of
unpredicted outcomes threatening safety. There are
also of course external disturbances like economic
constraints (less time and investment in safety re-
lated activities), public opinion, regulatory enforce-
ment etc. These disturbances affect the variables that
need to be assessed.
© Perception
This relates to the ability of the organisation to ob-
serve the chosen affected variables and steer or im-
prove their control of them. This could be based on
auditing techniques, when it comes to evaluating the
level of compliance with standards or procedures.
Other ways of gathering information can be applied
when the observed variables concern more
"intangible" aspects like risk perception, safety cul-
ture, power plays etc. and would be ensured by
methods like questionnaires, interviewing, observa-
tions. In both MIRIAM and I-RISK this perception
aspect is operationalised with arrows that indicate
these information flows.
© Repres en tation
The way this information is represented at all levels
of the organisation is also fundamental. How is this
represented information perceived by the system?
Can it be quantitative, or is it better qualitative?
What sort of indicators are possible when major haz-
ard prevention imposes a no outcome (accident) ob-
jective and requirement (zero incidents/accidents
does not mean the same thing as zero risk)? How to
create a picture of the state of the variables? In both
MIRIAM and I-RISK the exact content of these per-
formance indicators is left open, because of the
functional approach. This representational aspect is
contained in the arrows. Management has to fill
them in, but the arrows imply that connections be-
tween those functions of the management system are
ensured. The quality of this connection depends on
the quality of the information, and therefore part of
this is its representation.
0 Information processing
Once this information is represented, how is it
treated? How will good decision-making be ensured,
considering this information about the state of the
observed variables? In both MIRIAM and I-RISK
this information-processing activity is represented
through the use of arrows that indicate informa-
tion/decision/action flows. The quality of this activ-
ity relies on the ability of the information's receiver
to interpret properly the information that is repre-
sented in a specific way, according to the affected
variables that are chosen. (See © above)
3 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE
TECHNICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL
MODELS
Both models need to create an interface in order to
somehow "plug" the organisational model into the
technical one.
In MIRIAM, the interface is based on the preven-
tion barriers. The technical model describes scenar-
ios determined by risk analysis, that are prevented
thanks to safety critical functions, represented by
barriers chosen in the (organisational) design proc-
ess. These barriers can be safety devices or safety
activities, which fulfil the safety critical functions
that need to be implemented at any time to ensure
the level of risk control. Barriers are multiple, inter-
vening at various stages in the development of the
scenarios. This is the defence-in-depth approach.
MIRIAM links to this approach by assessing the
management system in terms of its ability to estab-
lish and maintain the quality of the barriers.
This interface is presented in figure 3, part of the
MIRIAM modelling.
Identification and evaluation of major hazards :
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Figure 3: MIRIAM modelling, interface based on barriers divided in activities and
safety critical devices
I-RISK has an approach based on the implemen-
tation of a probabilistic method (QRA, Quantitative
Risk Assessment). It focuses on initiating and base
events as well as barriers, found in the calculation of
the failure probability through the use of fault trees.
This makes the interface more detailed than in
MIRIAM. It is explicitly aimed at connecting with
the QRA parameters, which are the following:
- Frequency of external events.
- Failure rate of unmonitored (standby) or moni-
tored components.
Time between testing.
Error in test and repair.
- Failure to detect and recover previous error in
test and repair.
Frequency of routine maintenance.
Duration of unavailability due to routine mainte-
nance.
Duration of repair.
Probability of error in operations or emergency.
Probability of not detecting and recovering error.
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Figure 4:1-RISK modelling, Interface based on parameters used in QRA
The interface consists, therefore, in connecting
these parameters with the process decomposition.
This was found to be very complex, as it is really
hard to decompose in practice all the activities that
influence all of these parameters for all of the
equipment and actions which can fail in a complex
plant, as analysed by generic fault trees (figure 4). I-
RISK had to resort to grouping equipment, tasks and
parts of the organisation in terms of the similarity
(called "common mode") of their management, in
order to reduce this complexity and make the task of
auditing manageable. Rules were developed for this
grouping, but it remained a difficult aspect of the
modelling.
If there is no constraint imposed by the need to
make a detailed quantitative, QRA link between
technical and management models at the level of pa-
rameters, it may be appropriate to concentrate only
on the barriers - the MIRIAM approach, in order to
reduce the number of activities to be audited. The
level of major hazard prevention would thus depend
on the quality of the barriers, maintained by the
quality of the management through the implementa-
tion of the appropriate activities. However, rules will
still have to be developed in ARAMIS for grouping
barriers into "common modes", based on the simi-
larities of their management.
4 THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE
ACTIVITIES AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
The interface problem raises the question of the in-
fluence of the organisation on the elements, events,
or parameters coming from the technical risk analy-
sis. How are the parameters coming from the techni-
cal analysis influenced?
In MIRIAM these parameters are the safety criti-
cal devices and the safety critical activities. To en-
sure the quality of these, one needs to consider how
the safety critical devices are chosen, purchased, im-
plemented and maintained, and therefore the related
activities. Concerning the safety critical activities,
one needs to analyse closely how they are carried out
Considering this question leads the assessor to de-
fine how the management system influences these
activities carried out by the people. Looking at the
way activities are operated requires thinking about
how people behave according to their social and
physical context.
With a process approach, this becomes a question
about the constraints and resources allocated to the
people who perform a given activity that constitute
the context in which activities, and therefore the
work of individuals and group of individuals for any
type of activities, are performed. These factors are
defined as follows in MIRIAM:
Competence:
Competence is the generic term that gathers all
the abilities of an actor to take on his role and re-
sponsibilities and to use the technical support at his
disposal. These abilities are covered by the three
following dimensions:
•Knowledge:  concerns all the concepts and rules
known by the actors. Knowledge will help the
actor understand a situation and a context but
does not necessarily help make decisions and de-
cide actions.
•Know-how,  concerns the part of knowledge which
is action-oriented. It is applicable to practical
situations and very often already automated in
the actor's mind. Know-how is intimately linked
to experience.
•Safety  behaviour, consists in working out careful
solutions, in accepting the cost of these careful
solutions and also in investing resources to de-
velop new careful solutions. In our research, this
dimension is very much linked to the values.
Co-ordination
Co-ordination is the generic term which allows
work first to be divided into tasks and allocated to
different human and material resources, and then for
the various tasks to be co-ordinated into a coherent
whole again. It provides the answer to the question
"Who does what, when, where and how?"
Co-ordination in MIRIAM is represented by the
three following dimensions:
•Definition  of roles and responsibilities: this repre-
sents the two following aspects that need to be
managed: task planning (What is to be done,
where, when?) and resource allocation (Who
does what?)
•Modes  of communication: what channels and
modes do people use for coordination?
•Modes  of decision-making: how and where are de-
cisions made?
Technical support
This generic dimension concerns the whole set of
techniques (conceptual and material) that should en-
able an actor to achieve his objectives or effective-
ness in his activity.
Technical support answers the question "How and
what should a task be done with?" Technical support
refers to:
•Methods,  operating procedures: the answer to how
question.
•Tools,  device, and man / machine interface: an-
swer to what with question?
These factors have been identified mainly through
the body of knowledge found in organisational soci-
ology.
In I-RISK, these influence factors are called de-
livery systems, to emphasise that they are delivered
by management processes, linked often to specific
staff functions of an organisation, which deliver re-
sources and controls in the sense defined by SADT.
These influencing factors (resources and constraints)
have also been derived from the literature and previ-
ous modelling projects.
Competence: the knowledge, skills and abilities in
the form of first-line and/or back-up personnel
who have been selected and trained for the safe
execution of the critical primary business func-
tions and activities in the organisation (compara-
ble to the knowledge influencing factor in
MIRIAM).
Availability: allocating the necessary time (or
numbers) of competent people to the safety-critical
primary business tasks which have to be carried
out.
Commitment: the incentives and motivation
which personnel have to carry out their tasks and
activities with suitable care and alertness, and ac-
cording to the appropriate safety criteria and pro-
cedures specified for the activities by the organi-
sation (comparable to the safety behaviour
influencing factor in MIRIAM)
Interface and modifications: The ergonomics of
all aspects of the plant which are used/operated by
operations, inspection or maintenance (meets the
tools, device, man/machine interface influencing
factor in MIRIAM)
Spares: These are the equipment & spares which
are installed during maintenance, which need to be
the correct spares and in good condition for the re-
placement.
Internal communication and co-ordination: In-
ternal communications are those communications
which occur implicitly, or explicitly within any
primary business activity, i.e. within one task or
activity linking to a parameter of the technical
model, in order to ensure that the tasks are co-
ordinated and carried out according to the relevant
criteria (comparable to the modes of communica-
tion, influencing factor in MIRIAM)
Conflict resolution: The mechanisms (such as
management decision, supervision, monitoring,
group discussion) by which potential and actual
conflicts between safety and other criteria in the
allocation and use of personnel, hardware and
other resources are recognised, avoided or re-
solved if they occur (comparable to the mode of
decision making influencing factor in MIRIAM)
Procedures, Output goals and Plans: Rules and
procedures are specific performance criteria which
specify in detail, often in written form, a
"normative" behaviour or method for carrying out
an activity (checklist, task list, action steps, plan,
instruction manual, fault-finding heuristic, form to
be completed, etc.). Output goals are performance
measures for an activity which specify what the
result of the activity should be, but not how the re-
sults should be achieved. Plans refer to explicit
planning of activities in time, either how fre-
quently tasks should be done, or when and by
whom they will be done within a particular time
period (month, shutdown period, etc.) (comparable
to the methods, operating procedures influencing
factor in MIRIAM)
From this description one can say that the two
sets of influencing factors in the MIRIAM and I-
RISK models are very close to each other. What dif-
ferences there are represent some complementarity.
Merging of the two lists provides a still more com-
plete list of influences.
The next question is how these factors (resources
and constraints) are combined in the model to pro-
duce a given unwanted outcome. We use as example
the event "incorrect weld performed by an operator",
found in a fault tree. A practical question is what
factors lead to this error and how could/should they
be avoided? Where does it appear in the models.
It falls under the maintenance activities, the
welding that has to be performed. There are a
number of possible reasons why the error could
occur. These are represented in the influencing
factors. It may be that the organisation should
provide more training, because the welder is not
competent. It may be that welders routinely violate
procedures and the organisation should ensure more
commitment. It could be that the welder did not
receive clear instructions about what to do, because
there is poor co-ordination between groups
concerned, or that there is no procedure for checking
work. Should the welding procedure be enhanced,
better written? Perhaps the workplace in which the
welding takes place is poorly laid out or physically
awkward and should be redesigned. All these factors
and more are covered under the influencing factors
and their delivery systems. Both models provide the
classifications and checklists of factors which allow
the analyst to predict and discover all of these factors
and to examine, in the specific company, how good
the management systems are to prevent these short-
comings. How this evaluation is carried out will de-
pend in detail on the conceptual framework they
have in taking account of this human factor.
5 THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE
HUMAN FACTOR
Even if there is a similar vision on the influencing
factors between the MIRIAM and I-RISK models,
their conceptual frameworks for considering the hu-
man factor differ. For the question "how to explain
observed or expected behaviours within the imple-
mentation of an activity", two types of practice,
based on different human factor approaches, are de-
scribed in the two models. MIRIAM goes into much
more detail at this point to understand why the indi-
viduals behave in the way they do. I-RISK takes a
more generic approach, emphasising the influences
to manage the actions and errors. When represented
in a fault tree, I-RISK limits itself to the questions
shown in figure 5.
In MIRIAM the influencing factors are to be un-
derstood through the conceptual framework of a
strategy. From a strategic point of view, to act is to
pursue an objective (to resolve problems) by making












Figure 5: How do the factors influence human error ?
This theory considers that all human behaviours
can be analysed as individual strategies or as the re-
sult of aggregating collective strategies. The strate-
gies are worked out by actors. Actors are individuals
or groups. The collective strategies in an organisa-
tion can be analysed like the rules of a game. The
game can be easily compared to a theatre play. Each
actor plays his own role; his strategy is his interpre-
tation of the role. Performing the whole play requires
(explicit and tacit) collective bargaining in order for
everyone to co-ordinate.
The notion of strategy also refers to the notion of
reason. To analyse human acts as specific solutions
to given problems is equivalent to acknowledging
that actors always have good reasons to act as they
do. These reasons are always at least subjectively
good, even though they may not be objectively.
This is the theoretical point of view that MIRIAM
provides to help the external observer to be able,
through interviews, to uncover how activities and
organisations function. The aim is to understand the
influences on the strategies, in order to modify them.
This is necessary when they do not comply with the
essential safety requirements, or do not allow the
actor(s) to take appropriate safety actions when fac-
ing, for example, unexpected situations or unplanned
emergencies.
Looking at strategies means looking at the infor-
mal part of the organisation, a part that is not written
or found in formal procedures, but which gives a
complementary view of the organisational life. This
informal part, corresponding to the aggregation of
collective strategies, rules daily activities and forms
what has come to be known as the safety culture of
the organisation. This approach, consisting in re-
vealing these unwritten rules, is a useful addition to
the safety management assessment found in I-RISK.
In the MIRIAM modelling this has been repre-
sented as a separate part, where the strategy can be






















Figure 6. Actors ' strategy in MIRIAM
In I-RISK this aspect of culture is relatively un-
derrepresented. There are elements of 'the actors'
strategy in the delivery systems of 'commitment' and
'conflict resolution', but these are approached from
an implicitly normative viewpoint.
6 EXPERT JUDGEMENT AND MANAGEMENT
PRIORITIES
An issue which I-RISK has dealt with explicitly,
but which remains implicit in MIRIAM is the ques-
tion of how important each of the influences is on
the ultimate achievement of the safety goals (the
control of the parameters in I-RISK, or the barriers
in MIRIAM). The approach relies on an expert
judgement procedure to identify among all the influ-
encing factors defined, which are the most important
ones. Expert judgement consists in asking to experts
in a specific field to answer questions about a sub-
ject, using systematic elicitation techniques (Cooke
1991. In a series of pilot studies (Hale et al 2000)
experts in maintenance management were asked to
use a paired comparison technique to compare the
effect of influencing factors, drawn from the 8 I-
RISK delivery systems (see section 4 above), on
maintenance parameters (see section 3 above). A
mathematical treatment of the answers showed
which areas generated a sufficient level of agreement
for the results to be meaningful. This provided an
empirical basis for priorities in auditing and propos-
als for change. The I-RISK approach is more empiri-
cal than MIRIAM in this respect, being driven by the
requirements of quantification (QRA context).
7 THE MODELLING REPRESENTATION
The organisational modelling in both MIRIAM and
I-RISK is a mental representation that helps an as-
sessor to structure his/her approach to the organisa-
tion, for assessment purposes.
They are representations of a reality which is very
complex and which can be observed from various
angles and therefore be modelled in different man-
ners. The modelling chosen depends on the con-
straints and objectives within which the modellers
designed it.
The MIRIAM representation had as constraint
that it must be transferable to industrialists. This
constraint led the modellers to emphasise the visu-
alisation of the model, through the use of colours
and to simplify it, to have less elements as well as
less visible connections between these elements.
Moreover the MIRIAM model separated the
modelling into two parts, in order to emphasise the
conceptual human factor approach. The strategy is
the core concept of that approach, and its application
for safety purpose is highlighted by a second repre-
sentation.
Because it had a more quantitative objective, I-
RISK had to be as complete as possible about the
factors which make a significant difference to the
risk numbers. The expert judgement studies in sec-
tion 6 above were aimed at filling the gaps in knowl-
edge about which these are. In the absence of such
data I-RISK had to make the assumption that all
factors were significant. This drove the study to
greater levels of detail than MIRIAM. This gives it
more of an expert perspective. Communication to
the user was an issue, which did lead to the aban-
donment of the full SADT analysis as representation,
but was less of a constraint than for MIRIAM.
As a consequence, the difference between the two
models is that MIRIAM looks simpler than I-RISK,
which contains more visual information about the
dynamic aspect of the organisation. The feedback
loops are explicitly represented in I-RISK, in several
recursive loops, but are only implicit in MIRIAM,
though learning is acknowledged as a fundamental
aspect of a safety management system there too.
It is not within the scope of this paper to create a
new modelling out of the two previous ones. How-
ever the ARAMIS project will tackle that task and
try to build on the strengths of both models to pro-
vide both clarity for outsiders and detail of the real-
ity of the dynamic feedback loops of organisations,
and integration of the strategic dimension of human
behaviour.
8 CONCLUSION
The comparison of models is a fruitful exercise that
allows modellers to exchange their views on com-
plex issues. It is a long process where "paradigms"
must be understood from both sides in order to inte-
grate the best of each, depending on the purposes.
The MIRIAM and I-RISK models have been
shown to be compatible with few conceptual differ-
ences. The models are both based on a functional
process decomposition in order to represent the dy-
namic nature (PDCA, feed back loop) of organisa-
tions. They are both independent from the technical
modellings (fault trees) for which a relevant inter-
face has to be defined. The two different interfaces -
base event parameters and safety barriers - are alter-
natives relevant for two different purposes. The pa-
rameters match existing QRA models better, but the
barriers provide more appropriate insight into risk
control options and their management.
The two interfaces describe influencing factors
that are very similar. The main difference between
the models lies in the conceptual approach to the
human factor, hi MIRIAM it is seen through the eyes
of the body of knowledge of organisational sociol-
ogy, and specifically through the strategy of the ac-
tors, hi I-RISK the emphasis on this cultural aspect
of organisations is less explicit and it is left to expert
judgement to define the most relevant influencing
factors. However I-RISK does, by this means tackle
the issue of prioritising management influences.
Finally the question of the modelling representa-
tion is raised. The purposes of the modelling, quali-
tative or quantitative, for risk analyst, practitioner or
manager, for assessment or improvement, must drive
the representation used. I-RISK and MIRIAM are
different in this respect, but their complementarity of
content means than they can potentially be com-
bined.
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